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Abstract
Recently, Mahloujifar and Mahmoody (TCC’17) studied attacks against learning algorithms using
a special case of Valiant’s malicious noise, called p-tampering, in which the adversary gets to change
any training example with independent probability p but is limited to only choose ‘adversarial’ examples
with correct labels. They obtained p-tampering attacks that increase the error probability in the so called
‘targeted’ poisoning model in which the adversary’s goal is to increase the loss of the trained hypothesis
over a particular test example. At the heart of their attack was an efficient algorithm to bias the expected
value of any bounded real-output function through p-tampering.
In this work, we present new biasing attacks for increasing the expected value of bounded real-valued
functions. Our improved biasing attacks, directly imply improved p-tampering attacks against learners in
the targeted poisoning model. As a bonus, our attacks come with considerably simpler analysis. We also
study the possibility of PAC learning under p-tampering attacks in the non-targeted (aka indiscriminate)
setting where the adversary’s goal is to increase the risk of the generated hypothesis (for a random
test example). We show that PAC learning is possible under p-tampering poisoning attacks essentially
whenever it is possible in the realizable setting without the attacks. We further show that PAC learning
under ‘no-mistake’ adversarial noise is not possible, if the adversary could choose the (still limited to
only p fraction of) tampered examples that she substitutes with adversarially chosen ones. Our formal
model for such ‘bounded-budget’ tampering attackers is inspired by the notions of (strong) adaptive
corruption in secure multi-party computation.
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1 Introduction
In his seminal work, Valiant [Val84] introduced the Probably Approximately Correct (PAC) model of learn-
ing that triggered a significant amount of work in the theory of machine learning.1 An important characteris-
tic of learning algorithms is their ability to cope with noise. Valiant also initiated a study of adversarial noise
[Val85] in which each incoming training example is chosen, with independent probability p, by an adversary
who knows the learning algorithm. Since no assumptions are made on such adversarial examples, this type
of noise is called malicious. Subsequently, Kearns and Li [KL93] and the follow-up work of Bshouty et. al
[BEK02] essentially proved impossibility of PAC learning under such malicious noise by heavily relying on
the existence of mistakes (i.e., wrong labels) in adversarial examples given to the learner under a carefully
chosen specific distribution. In its simplest form, the main idea of their approach was to make it impossible
for the learner to distinguish between two different target concepts, and this was achieved by generating
wrong labels at an appropriate rate under a carefully chosen pathological distribution. This approach for
obtaining a negative result is a consequence of Valiant’s model of distribution-free PAC learning, since in
general, the learning algorithms have to be able to deal with well with all distributions.2
The method of induced distributions gained popularity and was seen as a tool that was used in order to
prove negative results within various noise models. Sloan in [Slo95] used this method in order to determine
an upper bound on the error rate that can be tolerated in a noise model where the labels can be mislabeled
maliciously. Bshouty, Eiron, and Kushilevitz [BEK02] studied a noise model closely related to Valiant’s
malicious noise, in which the adversary is allowed to make its choices based on the full knowledge of the
original training examples; in their work they used the method of induced distributions in order to give an
upper bound on the maximum amount of noise that can be tolerated by any learning algorithm.
In contrast to the works of [KL93, Slo95, BEK02] who used the method of (pathological) induced
distributions from where the malicious samples were drawn, in this work we are interested in attackers who
do not have any control over the the original distributions, but they can choose and inject malicious examples
in certain (restricted) ways. On the other hand, it is also worth noting that near the end of our work in this
paper we also provide a construction for a negative result within PAC learning. Interestingly, our idea for the
behavior of the adversary that yields this negative learning result in our framework, is the same as the key
idea underlying the method of induced distributions where one tries to make it impossible for the learner to
disambiguate between competing target concepts; however, in our context no wrong labels are used.
Poisoning attacks. Impossibility results against learning under adversarial noise could be seen as attacks
against learners in which the attacker injects some malicious training examples to the training set and tries
to prevent the learner from finding a hypothesis with low risk. Such attackers, in general, are studied in the
context of poisoning (a.k.a causative) attacks3 [BNS+06, BNL12, PMSW16]. Such attacks could happen
naturally when a learning process happens over time [RNH+09b, RNH+09a] and the adversary has some
noticeable chance of injecting or substituting malicious training data in an online manner. A stronger form
of poisoning attacks are the so called targeted (poisoning) attacks [BNS+06, STS16], where the adversary
performs the poisoning attack while she has a particular test example in mind, and her goal is to make
the final generated hypothesis fail on that particular test example. While poisoning attacks against specific
1The original model studies learnability in a distribution-free sense, but it also make sense for classes of distributions; [BI91].
2 In fact, determining properties of distribution-free learning algorithms by looking at their behavior under specific distributions
makes sense in the noise-free setting as well; for example, [BEHW89, EHKV89] obtain lower bounds on the number of examples
needed for learning by looking at specific distributions.
3At a technical level, the malicious noise model also allows the adversary to know the full state (and thus the randomness) of
the learner, while this knowledge is not given to the adversary of the poisoning attacks, who might be limited in other ways as well.
3
learners were studied before [ABL14, XBB+15, STS16], the recent work of Mahloujifar and Mahmoody
[MM17a] presented a generic targeted poisoning attack that could adapt to apply to any learner, so long as
there is an initial non-negligible error over the target point.
p-tampering attacks. The work of [MM17a] proved their result using a special case of Valiant’s mali-
cious noise, called p-tampering, in which the attacker can only use mistake-free malicious noise. Namely,
similar to Valiant’s model, any incoming training example might be chosen adversarially with independent
probability p (see Definition 5 for a formalization). However, the difference between p-tampering noise and
Valiant’s malicious noise (and even from all of its special cases studied before [Slo95]) is that a p-tampering
adversary is only allowed to choose valid tampered examples with correct labels4 to substitute the original
examples. As such, although the attributes can change pretty much arbitrarily in the tampered examples, the
label of the tampered examples shall still reflect the correct label. For example, the adversary can repeatedly
present the same example to the learner, thus reducing the effective sample size, or it can be the case that the
adversary returns correct examples that are somehow chosen against the learner’s algorithm and based on
the whole history of the examples so far. Therefore, as opposed to the general model of Valiant’s malicious
noise, p-tampering noise/attacks are ‘defensible’ as the adversary can always claim that a malicious training
example is indeed generated from the same original distribution from which the rest of the training examples
are generated. Similar notions of defensible attacks are previously explored in the context of cryptographic
attacks [HIK+10, AL07]. Therefore, learning under p-tampering can be seen as a generalization of “robust-
ness” [XM12, YKW+07, GA15] in which the training distribution can adaptively and adversarially deviate
from the testing distribution without using wrong labels.
Biasing bounded functions. At the heart of the poisoning attacks of [MM17a] against learners was a p-
tampering attack for the more basic task of biasing the expected value of bounded real-valued functions. In
particular, [MM17a] proved that for any (polynomial time computable) function f mapping inputs drawn
from distributions like S ≡ Dn (consisting of n iid ‘blocks’) to [0, 1], there is always a polynomial time
p-tampering attacker A who changes the input distribution S into Ŝ while increasing the expected value
by at least p3+5p · Var[f(S)] where Var[·] is the variance.
5 (Note that the bias shall somehow depend on
Var[f(S)] since constant functions cannot be biased by changing their inputs.) On the other hand, the
work of [MM17a] shows that for some functions even computationally unbounded p-tampering attackers
(who can run in exponential time) cannot achieve better than
ln(1/µ)
1−µ · p · Var[f(S)] for all p, µ ∈ (0, 1),
if µ = E[f(S)], which because of limµ→1
ln(1/µ)
1−µ = 1, it means the best possible universal constant c
to achieve bias c · p · Var[f(S)] through p-tampering is at most c ≤ 1. For the special case of Boolean
function f(·), or alternatively when the p-tampering attacker is allowed to run in exponential time, [MM17a]
achieved almost optimal bias of p1+p·µ−p ·Var[f(S)] > p ·Var[f(S)]. Using their biasing attacks, [MM17a]
directly obtained p-tampering targeted poisoning attacks with related bounds. Therefore, a main question
that remained open after [MM17a] and is a subject of our study is the following. What is the maximum
possible bias of real-valued functions through p-tampering attacks? Resolving this question, directly leads
to improved p-tampering poisoning attacks against learners, when the loss function is real-valued.
4This is assuming that the original training distribution only contains correct labels.
5In the original version a slightly stronger bound of 2p
3+4p
·Var[f(S)] was claimed, though the full version [MM17b] corrected
this to the weaker bound p
3+5p
·Var[f(S)]
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1.1 Our Results
Improved p-tampering biasing attacks. Our main technical result in this work is to improve the efficient
(polynomial-time) p-tampering biasing attack of [MM17a] to achieve the bias of p1+p·µ−p · Var[f(S)] ≥
p · Var[f(S)] (where µ = E[f(S)] for S ≡ Dn and Var[·] is the variance) in polynomial time and for
real-valued bounded functions with output in [0, 1] (see Theorem 1). This main result immediately allows
us to get improved polynomial-time targeted p-tampering attacks against learners for scenarios where the
loss function is not Boolean (see Corollary 2). As in [MM17a], our attacks apply to any learning problem P
and any learner L for P as long as L has a non-zero initial error over a specific test example d.
Special case of p-resetting attacks. The biasing attack of [MM17a] has an extra property that for each
input block (or training example) di, if the adversary gets to tamper with di, it either does not change di at
all, or it simply ‘resets’ it by resampling it from the original (training) distribution D. In this work, we refer
to such limited forms of p-tampering attacks as p-resetting attacks. Interestingly, p-resetting attacks were
previously studied in the work of Bentov, Gabizon, and Zuckerman [BGZ16] in the context of (ruling out)
extracting uniform randomness from Bitcoin’s blockchain [Nak08] when the adversary controls p fraction
of the computing power.6 Bentov, et al. [BGZ16] showed how to achieve bias p/12 when the original
(untampered) distribution D is uniform and the function f is Boolean and balanced.7 As a special case of p-
tampering attacks, p-resetting attacks have interesting properties that are not present in general p-tampering
attacks. For example, if an attacker chooses its adversarial examples from a large pool by “skipping” some
of them, then p-resetting attacks need a pool of about ≈ (1+ p) ·n, while p-tampering attackers might need
much more. That is because, for each tampered example, the adversary simply needs to choose one out of
two original correctly labeled examples, while a p-tampering attacker might need more samples. Motivated
by special applications of p resetting attacks and the special properties of p-resetting attacks, in this work we
also study such attacks over arbitrary block distributions D and achieve bias of at least p1+p·µ · Var[f(S)],
improving the bias of p3+5p ·Var[f(S)] proved in [MM17a].
PAC learning under p-tampering. We also study the power of p-tampering (and p-resetting) attacks in
the non-targeted setting where the adversary’s goal is simply to increase the risk of the generated hypoth-
esis.8 In this setting, it is indeed meaningful to study the possibility (or impossibility) of PAC learning, as
the test example is chosen at random. We show that in this model, p-tampering attacks cannot prevent PAC
learnability for ‘realizable’ settings; that is when there is always a hypothesis consistent with the training
data (see Theorem 21). We further go beyond p-tampering attacks and study PAC learning under more
powerful adversaries who might choose the location of training examples that are tampered with but are
still limited to choose ≤ p · n such examples. We show that PAC learning under such adversaries depends
on whether the adversary makes its tampering choices before or after getting to see the original sample di.
We call these two class of attacks, respectively, weak and strong p-budget tampering attacks (see Defini-
tion 19). Our notion of strong p-budget tampering is inspired by notions of adaptive corruption [CFGN96]
and particularly strong adaptive corruption [GKP15a] studied in cryptographic contexts. Our impossibility
result of PAC learnability under strong p-budget attacks (see Theorem 23) shows that PAC learning under
‘mistake-free’ adversarial noise is not always possible.
6To compare the terminologies, the work of [BGZ16] studies p-resettable sources of randomness, while here we study p-
resetting attackers that generate such sources.
7The running time of the p-resetting attacker of [BGZ16] was poly(n, 2|D|) where |D| is the length of the binary representation
of any d← D. In contrast, our p-resetting attacks run in time poly(n, |D|).
8In the targeted setting, the ε parameter of (ε, δ)-PAC learning goes away, due to the pre-selection of the target test.
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Finally, we would like to point out that our positive result about PAC learnability under p-tampering
attacks (see Theorem 21) shows a stark contrast between the ‘mistake-free’ adversarial noise and general
malicious noise for p > 1/2. Indeed, when the adversary can tamper with p ≈ 1/2 fraction of the training
data in an arbitrary way for a binary classification problem, it can make the training data completely useless
by always picking the labels at random from {0, 1}. Such adversary will end up changing only p ≈ 1/2 of
the examples, but will make the labels independent of the features. However, as we prove in Theorem 21,
PAC learning is possible under p-tampering for any constant p < 1.
Applications beyond attacking learners. Similar to how [MM17a] used their biasing attacks in applica-
tions other than attacking learners, our new biasing attacks can also be used to obtain improved polynomial-
time attacks for biasing the output bit of any seedless randomness extractors [VN51, CG85, SV86], as well as
blockwise p-tampering (and p-resetting) attacks against security of indistinguishability-based cryptographic
primitives (e.g., encryption, secure computation, etc.). As in [MM17a], our new improved biasing attacks
apply to any joint distribution (e.g., martingales) when the tampered values affect the random process in an
online way. In this work, however, we focus on the case of product distributions as they suffice for getting
our attacks against learners and include all the main ideas even for the general case of random processes.
We refer the reader to the work of [MM17a] for the extra applications.
Recent positive results achieving algorithmic robustness. On the positive (algorithmic) side, the semi-
nal works of Diakonikolas et al. [DKK+16] and Lai et al. [LRV16] showed the surprising power of algorith-
mic robust inference over poisoned data with error that does not depend on the dimension of the distribution
(but still depends on the fraction of poisoned data). These works led to an active line of work (e.g., see
[CSV17, DKS17, DKS18a, DKK+18, PSBR18, DKS18b] and references therein) exploring the possibil-
ity of robust statistics over poisoned data with algorithmic guarantees. The works of [CSV17, DKS18a]
performed list-decodable learning, and [DKK+18, PSBR18] studied supervised learning. In our attacks,
however, similarly to virtually all attacks in the literature (over specific learners and models) we demon-
strate inherent power of poisoning attacks (that apply to any learner and hypothesis class) to amplify the
error of classifiers starting from small and perhaps acceptable error rates, while after the attack the error
probability is essentially one. Namely, our results show that in order to resist poisoning attacks, the same
algorithms should do much better in the no-attack setting, as otherwise a poisoning attacker can increase the
targeted error probability significantly.
1.1.1 Ideas behind our new biasing attacks and our approach
Our new biasing attacks built upon ideas developed in previous work [RVW04, DOPS04, BEG17, DY15,
BGZ16] in the context of attacking deterministic randomness extractors from the so called Santha-Vazirani
sources [SV86]. In [MM17a] the authors generalized the idea of ‘half-space’ sources (introduced in [RVW04,
DOPS04]) to real-valued functions, using which they showed how to find p-tampering biasing attacks with
bias p1+p·µ−p · Var[f(S)]. However, their attacks need inefficient (i.e., super polynomial time) tampering
algorithms. In particular, [MM17a] directly defined a perturbed joint distribution Ŝ = (D̂1, . . . , D̂n) of the
original product distribution S ≡ D such that has two properties hold: (1) E[f(Ŝ)] achieves the desired
bias, and (2) Pr[Ŝ = z] ≤ c · Pr[S = z] for all points z and sufficiently small constant c, meaning that Ŝ
does not increase the point-wise probabilities “too much”. It was shown in [MM17a] that the second prop-
erty guarantees that the distribution Ŝ can be obtained from S by some tampering algorithm, but their proof
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was existential, namely it said nothing about the computational complexity of such tampering algorithm.
Achieving the same bias efficiently for real-valued functions is the main technical challenge in this work.
Our approach. At a very high level, we show how to achieve in polynomial-time the same bias achieved
in [MM17a] through the following two steps.
1. We first show how to obtain the same exact final distribution achieved in [MM17a] through local p-
tampering decisions that could be implemented in polynomial time using an idealized oracle fˆ [·] that
provides certain information about function f(·).
2. We then, show that the idealized oracle fˆ [·] can be approximated in polynomial time, and more im-
portantly, the p-tampering attack of the previous step (using idealized oracle fˆ [·]) is robust to this
approximation and still achieves almost the same bias.
Idealized oracle fˆ [·]. Let d≤i = (d1, . . . , di) be the first i blocks given as input to a function f .
9 Now,
suppose the adversary gets the chance to determine the next block di+1 based on its knowledge of the
previously generated blocks (d1, . . . , di). We achieve the goal of the first step depicted above, with the help
of the following oracle provided for free to the p-tampering attacker.
fˆ [d≤i] = E
di+1,...,dn←Dn−i
[f(d1, . . . , dn)].
In other words, fˆ [d≤i] computes the expected value of f when each of the blocks (examples) di+1, . . . , dn
is drawn iid from D, while the first i blocks d1, . . . , di are fixed as dictated by d≤i.
Although the partial averages fˆ [d≤i] are not exactly computable in polynomial time, they can indeed
be efficiently approximated within arbitrary small additive error. As we show, our attacks are also robust
to such approximations, and using the approximations of fˆ [d≤i] (rather than their exact values) we can still
bound the bias. See Sections 3.2 and Section 3.3 for the details.
The case of p-resetting attacks. When it comes to p-resetting attacks, we cannot achieve the same bias
that we do achieve through general p-tampering attacks. However, we still use the same recipe as described
above. Namely, we use the idealized oracle fˆ [d≤i] to make careful local sampling to keep or reset a given
block di, so that the final distribution has the desired bias. We then approximate the idealized oracle while
arguing that the analysis is robust to this change.
Comparison with the polynomial-time attacker of [MM17a]. Asmentioned before, the work of [MM17a]
also provides polynomial p-tampering attacks with weaker bounds. At a high level, the attacks of [MM17a]
were simple to describe (without using the idealized oracle fˆ ), while their analyses were extremely com-
plicated and used the function fˆ as well as a carefully chosen potential functions based on ideas from
[ACM+14] in which authors presented a p-tampering biasing attack for the special case of uniform Boolean
blocks (i.e.,D ≡ U1). Our new (polynomial time) attacks takes a dual approach: the analysis of our attacks
are conceptually simpler, as they directly achieve the desired bias, but the description of our attacks are more
complicated as they also depend on the idealized oracle fˆ .
9Alternatively the first i training examples, when we attack learners. However, some of the blocks in (d1, . . . , di) might be the
result of previous tampering decisions.
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2 Preliminaries
Notation. We use calligraphic letters (e.g., D) for sets and capital non-calligraphic letters (e.g., D) for
distributions. By d ← D we denote that d is sampled from D. For a randomized algorithm L(·), by
y ← L(x) we denote the randomized execution of L on input x outputting y. For joint distributions (X,Y ),
by (X | y) we denote the conditional distribution (X | Y = y). By Supp(D) = {d | Pr[D = d] > 0}
we denote the support set of D. By D ∈ S we denote that D always outputs in S , namely Supp(D) ⊆ S .
By TD(·) we denote an algorithm T (·) with oracle access to a sampler for D. By D ≡ G we denote that
distributions D,G are identically distributed. By Dn we denote n iid samples from D. By ε(n) ≤ 1poly(n)
we mean ε(n) ≤ 1
nΩ(1)
and by t(n) ≤ poly(n) we mean t(n) ≤ nO(1).
A learning problem P = (X ,Y,D,H,Loss) is specified by the following components. The set X is the
set of possible instances, Y is the set of possible labels, D is a class of distributions containing some joint
distributions D ∈ D over X × Y .10 The set H ⊆ YX is called the hypothesis space or hypothesis class.
We consider loss functions Loss : Y × Y 7→ R+ where Loss(y
′, y) measures how different the ‘prediction’
y′ (of some possible hypothesis h(x) = y′) is from the true outcome y.11 We call a loss function bounded
if it always takes values in [0, 1]. A natural loss function for classification tasks is to use Loss(y′, y) = 0 if
y = y′ and Loss(y′, y) = 1 otherwise. For a given distribution D ∈ D, the risk of a hypothesis h ∈ H is the
expected loss of h with respect toD, namely RiskD(h) = E(x,y)←D [Loss(h(x), y)].
An example s is a pair s = (x, y) where x ∈ X and y ∈ Y . An example is usually sampled from a
distribution D. A sample set (or sequence) S of size n is a set (or sequence) of n examples. A hypothesis h
is consistent with a sample set (or sequence) S if and only if h(x) = y for all (x, y) ∈ S . We assume that
instances, labels, and hypotheses are encoded as strings over some alphabet such that given a hypothesis h
and an instance x, h(x) is computable in polynomial time.
Definition 1 (Realizability). We say that the problem P = (X ,Y,D,H,Loss) is realizable, if for allD ∈ D,
there exists an h ∈ H such that RiskD(h) = 0.
We can now define Probably Approximately Correct (PAC) learning. Our definition is with respect to a
given set of distributions D, and it can be instantiated with one distribution {D} = D to get the distribution-
specific case. We can also recover the distribution-independent scenario, whenever the projection of D over
X covers all distributions.
Definition 2 (PAC Learning). A realizable problem P = (X ,Y,D,H,Loss) is (ε, δ)-PAC learnable if there
is a (possibly randomized) learning algorithm L such that for every n and every D ∈ D, it holds that,
Pr
S←Dn,h←L(S)
[RiskD(h) ≤ ε(n)] ≥ 1− δ(n).
We call P simply PAC learnable if ε(n), δ(n) ≤ 1/poly(n), and we call it efficiently PAC learnable if, in
addition, L is running in polynomial time.
Definition 3 (Average Error of a Test). For a problem P = (X ,Y,D,H,Loss), a (possibly randomized)
learning algorithm L, a fixed test sample (x, y) = d ← D for some distribution S over Supp(D)n (e.g.,
10By using joint distributions over X × Y , we jointly model a set of distributions over X and a concept class mapping X to Y
(perhaps with noise and uncertainty).
11Natural loss functions such as the 0-1 loss or the square loss assign the same amount of loss for same labels computed by h
and c regardless of x.
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S ≡ Dn) for some n ∈ N, the average error12 of the test example d (with respect to S,L) is defined as,
ErrS,L(d) = E
S←S,h←L(S)
[Loss(h(x), y)].
We call ErrS,L = Ed←D ErrS,L(d) simply the average error. When L is clear from the context, we simply
write ErrS(d) (resp. ErrS) to denote ErrS,L(d) (resp. ErrS,L).
It is easy to see that a realizable problem P = (X ,Y,D,H,Loss) with bounded loss function Loss is
PAC learnable if and only if there is a learner L (for P) such that its average error ErrS is bounded by a fixed
1/poly(n) function for all D ∈ D.13
Poisoning attacks. PAC learning under adversarial noise is already defined in the literature, however, poi-
soning attacks include broader classes of attacks. For example, a poisoning adversary might add adversarial
examples to the training data (thus, increasing its size) or remove some of it adversarially. A more powerful
form of poisoning attack is the so called targeted poisoning attack where the adversary gets to know the
target test example before poisoning the training examples. More formally, suppose S = (d1, . . . , dn) is
the training examples iid sampled from D ∈ D. For a poisoning attacker A, by Ŝ ← A(S) we denote the
process through which A generates an adversarial training set Ŝ based on S . Note that, this notation does
not specify the exact limitations of how A is allowed to tamper with S , and that is part of the definition of
A. In the targeted case, the adversary A is also given a test example (x, y) = d← D. So, we would denote
this by writing Ŝ ← A(d,S) to emphasize that d is the test example given as input to A. We use calligraphic
A to denote a class of attacks. Note that a particular adversary A ∈ A might try to poison a training set
S based on the knowledge of a problem P = (X ,Y,D,H,Loss). On the other hand, because sometimes
we would like to limit the adversary’s power based on the specific distribution D (e.g., by always choosing
tampered data to be in Supp(D)), byAD ⊆ A we denote the adversary class for a particular distribution D.
Definition 4 (Learning under poisoning). Suppose P = (X ,Y,D,H,Loss) is a problem, A = ∪D∈DAD is
an adversary class, and L is a (possibly randomized) learning algorithm for P.
• PAC learning under poisoning. For problem P, L is an (ε, δ)-PAC learning algorithm for P under
poisoning attacks of A, if for every D ∈ D, n ∈ N, and every adversary A ∈ AD,
Pr
S←Dn,Ŝ←A(S),h←L(Ŝ)
[RiskD(h) ≤ ε(n)] ≥ 1− δ(n).
PAC learnability and efficient PAC learnability are then defined similarly to Definition 2.
• Average error under targeted poisoning. If A contains targeted poisoning attackers, for a distribu-
tion D ∈ D and an attack A ∈ AD, the average error Err
A
Dn(d) for a test example d = (x, y) under
poisoning attacker A is equal to Err
Ŝ
(d) where Ŝ ≡ A(d, S) for S ≡ Dn.
12The work [MM17a] called the same notion the ‘cost’ of d.
13Suppose Loss(·) is bounded (i.e., always in [0, 1]). If P is (ε, δ)-PAC learnable, then by a union bound, ErrS ≤ ε + δ.
Moreover, if L is not (ε, δ)-PAC learnable, then its average error is at least ε · δ. This means that if L has average error γ = ErrS ,
then L is an (
√
γ,
√
γ)-PAC learner as well.
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p-tampering attacks. We now define the specific class of poisoning attacks studied in this work. In-
formally speaking, p-tampering attacks model attackers who will manipulate the training sequence S =
(d1, . . . , dn) in an online way, meaning while tampering with di, they do not rely on the knowledge of
dj , j > i. Moreover, such attacks get to tamper with di only with independent probability p, modeling
scenarios where the tampering even is random and outside the adversary’s choice. A crucial point about
p-tampering attacks is that they always stay in Supp(D). The formal definition follows.
Definition 5 (p-tampering/resetting attacks). The class of p-tampering attacks Aptam = ∪D∈DAD is defined
as follows. For a distribution D ∈ D, any A ∈ AD has a (potentially randomized) tampering algorithm
Tam such that (1) given oracle access to D, TamD(·) ∈ Supp(D), and (2) given any training sequence
S = (d1, . . . , dn), the tampered Ŝ = (d̂1, . . . , d̂n) is generated by A inductively (over i ∈ [n]) as follows.
• With probability 1− p, let d̂i = di.
• Otherwise, (this happens with probability p), get d̂i ← Tam
D(1n, d̂1, . . . , d̂i−1, di).
The class of p-resetting attacks Apres ⊂ A
p
tam include special cases of p-tampering attacks where the tam-
pering algorithm Tam is restricted as follows. Either Tam(1n, d̂1, . . . , d̂i−1, di) outputs di, or otherwise, it
will output a fresh sample d′i ← D. In the targeted case, the adversary AD and its tampering algorithm Tam
are also given the final test example d0 ← D as extra input (that they can read but not tamper with). An
attacker AD is called efficient, if its oracle-aided tampering algorithm Tam
D runs in polynomial time.
Subtle aspects of the definition. Even though one can imagine a more general definition for tampering
algorithms, in all the attacks of [MM17a] and the attacks of this work, the tampering algorithms do not need
to know the original un-tampered values d1, . . . , di−1. Since our goal here is to design p-tampering attacks,
we use the simplified definition above, while all of our positive results still hold for the stronger version in
which the tampering algorithm is given the full history of the tampering algorithm. Another subtle issue is
about whether di is needed to be given to the tampering algorithm. As already noted in [MM17a], when we
care about p-tampering distributions of Dn, di is not necessary to be given to the tampering algorithm Tam,
as Tam can itself sample a copy from D and treat it like di. Therefore the ‘stronger’ form of such attacks
(where di is given) is equivalent to the ‘weaker’ form where di is not given. In fact, if D is samplable
in polynomial time, then this equivalence holds with respect to efficient adversaries (with efficient Tam
algorithm) as well. In this work, for both p-tampering and p-resetting attacks we choose to always give di to
Tam. Interestingly, as we will see in Section 4, if the adversary can choose the p · n locations of tampering,
the weak and strong attackers will have different powers!
2.1 Concentration Bounds
Definition 6 (Hoeffding inequality [Hoe63]). Let X1, . . . ,Xn be n independent random variables where
Supp(Xi) ⊆ [0, 1] for all i ∈ [n]. Let X =
1
n
∑n
i=1Xi and λ = E [X]. Then, for any ξ ≥ 0,
Pr [|X − λ| ≥ ξ] ≤ 2e−2nξ
2
.
Definition 7 (Chernoff Bound [Che52]). Let X1, . . . ,Xn be n independent boolean random variables,
Supp(Xi) ⊆ {0, 1} for all i ∈ [n]. Let X =
1
n
∑n
i=1Xi and λ = E [X]. Then, for any γ ∈ [0, 1],
Pr [X ≥ (1 + γ) · λ] ≤ e−n·λ·γ
2/3 ,
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3 Improved p-Tampering and p-Resetting Poisoning Attacks
In this section we study the power of p-tampering attacks in the targeted setting and improve upon the p-
tampering and p-resetting attacks of [MM17a]. Our main tool is the following theorem giving new improved
p-tampering and p-resetting attacks to bias the output of bounded real-valued functions.
3.1 The Statement of Results
Theorem 1 (Improved biasing attacks). Let D be any distribution, S ≡ Dn, and f : Supp(S) → [0, 1].
Suppose µ = E[f(S)] and ν = Var[f(S)] be the expected value and the variance of f(S) respectively. For
every constant p ∈ (0, 1), and a given parameter ξ ∈ (0, 1), the following holds.
1. There is a p-tampering attack Atam such that,
E
Ŝ←Atam(S)
[f(Ŝ)] ≥ µ+
p · ν
1 + p · µ− p
− ξ
and given oracle access to f and sampling oracle for D, the tampering algorithm TamD,ftam of Atam
could be implemented in time poly(|D| · n/ξ) where |D| is the bit length of d← D.
2. There is a p-resetting attack Ares such that,
E
Ŝ←Ares(S)
[f(Ŝ)] ≥ µ+
p · ν
1 + p · µ
− ξ
and given oracle access to f and sampling oracle for D, the tampering algorithm TamD,fres of Ares
could be implemented in time poly(|D| · n/ξ) where |D| is the bit length of d← D.
See Section 3.2 for the full proof of Theorem 1. In this section, we use Theorem 1 and obtain the
following improved attacks in the targeted setting against any learner. In particular, for any fixed (x, y) =
d← D, the following corollary follows from Theorem 1 by letting f(S) = Eh←L(S)[Loss(h(x), y)].
Corollary 2 (Improved targeted p-tampering attacks). Given a problem P = (X ,Y,D,H,Loss) with a
bounded loss function Loss, for any distribution D ∈ D, test example (x, y) = d ← D, learner L, and
n ∈ N, let µ = ErrD(d) be the average error for d, and let,
ν = Var
S←Dn
[
E
h←L(S)
[Loss(h(x), y)]
]
.
Then, for any constant 0 < p < 1, and any 0 < ξ < 1 there is a p-tampering (resp. p-resetting) attack
Atam (resp. Ares) that increases the average error by
p·ν
1+p·µ−p − ξ (resp.
p·ν
1+p·µ − ξ). Moreover, if D is
polynomial-time samplable and both functions f,Loss are polynomial-time computable, then Atam,Ares
could be implemented in poly(|D| · n/ξ) time.
Remark 3.1. Even when the average error µ = ErrD(d) is not too small, the variance ν (as defined in
Corollary 2) could be negligible in general. However, for natural cases this cannot happen. For example, if
the loss function Loss(·) is Boolean (e.g., P is a classification problem) and if L is a deterministic learning
algorithm, then ν = µ · (1− µ).
We now demonstrate the power of p-tampering and p-resetting attacks on PAC learners by using them
to increase the failure probability of deterministic PAC learners.
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Corollary 3 (p-tampering attacks on PAC learners). Given a problem P = (X ,Y,D,H,Loss),D ∈ D, n ∈
N, and deterministic learner L, suppose,
Pr
S←Dn, h=L(S)
[RiskD(h) ≥ ε] = δ.
Then, there is a poly(|D| · n/ε) time p-tampering attack Atam and a p-resetting attack Ares such that,
Pr
S←Dn,Ŝ←Atam(S),h=L(Ŝ)
[RiskD(h) ≥ 0.99 · ε] ≥ δ +
p · (δ − δ2)
1 + p · δ − p
− e−n
Pr
S←Dn,Ŝ←Ares(S),h=L(Ŝ)
[RiskD(h) ≥ 0.99 · ε] ≥ δ +
p · (δ − δ2)
1 + p · δ
− e−n.
Before proving this we prove a useful proposition.
Proposition 3.2. The following functions are increasing for δ ∈ [0, 1] and any constant p ∈ (0, 1).
γtam(δ) = δ +
p · (δ − δ2)
1 + p · δ − p
, γres(δ) = δ +
p · (δ − δ2)
1 + p · δ
.
Proof. The lemma holds because we have,
∂γtam
∂δ
=
1− p
(p(δ − 1) + 1)2
> 0 and
∂γres
∂δ
=
1 + p
(p · δ + 1)2
> 0 .
Proof of Corollary 3. The inefficient versions of the attacks follow from Theorem 1 by letting f(S) = 1 if
RiskD(h) ≥ ε and f(S) = 0 otherwise. When the attacks are supposed to run in polynomial time, we have
to approximate RiskD(h) using oracle access toD. Suppose we have access to some oracle f˜(.) such that,
f˜(S) =

1 if RiskD(L(S)) ≥ ε,
0 if RiskD(L(S)) ≤ 0.99 · ε,
0 or 1 if 0.99 · ε ≤ RiskD(L(S)) ≤ ε.
We first show that by using the oracle f˜(.) instead of f(·), we can achieve the desired bias, and then we will
approximate f(·) using oracle access to a sampling oracle for D such that we obtain a simulated oracle for
f˜(.) with probability 1− e−n.
If δ˜ = ES←Dn [f˜(S)], then Theorem 1 shows that given oracle access to f˜(.), there is a p-tampering
attack Atam and a p-resetting attack Ares that can bias the average of f˜ as,
E
S←Dn,Ŝ←Atam(S)
[f˜(Sˆ)] ≥ δ˜ + p ·
p · (δ˜ − δ˜2)
1 + p · δ˜ − p
, E
S←Dn,Ŝ←Ares(S)
[f˜(Sˆ)] ≥ δ˜ + p ·
p · (δ˜ − δ˜2)
1 + p · δ˜
.
On the other hand, we know that for all S ∈ Supp(Dn), f(S) ≤ f˜(S). Therefore,
δ = E
S←Dn
[f(S)] ≤ δ˜.
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We also know that f˜(S) = 1 implies that Risk(L(S)) ≥ 0.99 · ε, thus for any distribution Z defined on
Supp(Dn) we have,
E
Ŝ←Z
[f˜(Sˆ)] ≤ Pr
Ŝ←Z
[Risk(L(Sˆ)) ≥ 0.99 · ε].
Combining the above inequalities for the p-tampering attack, we get,
Pr
S←Dn,Ŝ←Atam(S)
[Risk(L(Sˆ)) ≥ 0.99 · ε] ≥ E
S←Dn,Ŝ←Atam(S)
[f˜(Sˆ)]
≥ δˆ + p ·
p · (δ˜ − δ˜2)
1 + p · δ˜ − p
(By Proposition 3.2) ≥ δ + p ·
p · (δ − δ2)
1 + p · δ − p
.
Similarly, for the p-resetting attack we get,
Pr
S←Dn,Ŝ←Ares(S)
[Risk(L(Sˆ)) ≥ 0.99 · ε] ≥ E
S←Dn,Ŝ←Ares(S)
[f˜(Sˆ)]
≥ δˆ + p ·
p · (δ˜ − δ˜2)
1 + p · δ˜
(By Proposition 3.2) ≥ δ + p ·
p · (δ − δ2)
1 + p · δ
.
Now, we show how to obtain an oracle f˜(.) that provides the properties above with high probability by
accessing sampling oracle for D. The simulated oracle f˜(.) works as follows. Given a training set S , it
first performs L on S to get the hypothesis h. Then it samples m examples d1 = (x1, y1), . . . , dm =
(xm, ym) from D
m, for m to be chosen later, and it computes an “empirical risk” r(h) as follows: r(h) =
1
m
∑m
i=1 Loss(h, xi, yi). If r(h) ≥ 0.995, f˜(S) outputs 1, otherwise it outputs 0. By Hoeffding’s inequality,
it holds that,
Pr[|r(h)− RiskD(h)| ≥ 0.005 · ε] ≤ 2 · e
− m·ε
2
20000 .
Therefore,
Pr[((r(h) ≤ 0.995 · ε) ∧ (RiskD(h) ≥ ε)) ∨ ((r(h) ≥ 0.995 · ε) ∧ (RiskD(h) ≤ 0.99 · ε))] ≤ 2 · e
− m·ε
2
20000
which means that the oracle f˜(.) has the required properties with very high probability. Now, if the original
attacker Atam or Ares runs in time t = poly(|D| · n/ε), we choose m = poly(|D| · n/ε) large enough such
that t · e−
m·ε2
20000 ≤ e−n. In particular, we choosem ≥ (n+ ln(2t)) · 20000/ε2 . Therefore, by a union bound,
with probability 1− e−n, all the queries to f˜(·) would be within ±ε/200 of the answer that the ideal oracle
f(·) would provide. This concludes the proof of the corollary.
3.2 New p-Tampering and p-Resetting Biasing Attacks
In this subsection and Subsection 3.3 we prove Theorem 1. Our focus is on describing the relevant tam-
pering algorithms Tam; the general attacks will be defined accordingly. (Recall Definition 5 and that the
p-tampering attacker has an internal ‘tampering’ algorithm Tam that is executed with independent prob-
ability p.) We first describe our tampering algorithms in an ideal model where certain parameters of the
function f are given for free by an oracle. In Section 3.3, we get rid of this assumption by approximating
these parameters in polynomial time.
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Definition 8 (Function fˆ ). Let D be a distribution, f : Supp(S) 7→ R be defined over Dn for some n ∈ N,
and d≤i ∈ Supp(D)
i for some i ∈ [n]. We define the following functions.
• fd≤i(·) is a function defined as fd≤i(d≥i+1) = f(z) where z = (d≤i, d≥i+1) = (d1, . . . , dn).
• fˆ [d≤i] = Ed≥i+1←Dn−i [fd≤i(d≥i+1)]. We also use µ = fˆ [∅] to denote fˆ [d≤0] = E[f(S)].
The key idea in both of our attacks is to design them (to run in polynomial time) based on oracle access
to fˆ . The point is that fˆ could later be approximated within arbitrarily small 1/poly(n) factors, thus leading
to sufficiently close approximations of our attacks. After describing the ‘ideal’ version of the attacks, we
will describe how to make them efficient by approximating oracle calls to fˆ .
Changing the range of f(·). In both of our attacks, we describe our attacks using functions with range
[−1,+1]. To get the results of Theorem 1 we simply need to scale the parameters back appropriately.
3.2.1 New p-Tampering Biasing Attack (Ideal Version)
Our Ideal p-Tam attack below, might repeat a loop indefinitely, but as we will see in Section 3.3, we can cut
this rejection sampling procedure after a large enough polynomial number of rejection trials.
Construction 9 (Ideal p-Tam tampering). LetD be an arbitrary distribution and S ≡ Dn for some n ∈ N .
Also let f : Supp(D)n 7→ [−1,+1] be an arbitrary function.14 For any i ∈ [n], given a prefix d≤i−1 ∈
Supp(D)i−1,15 ideal p-Tam is a p-tampering attack defined as follows.
1. Let r[d≤i] =
1−fˆ [d≤i]
3−p−(1−p)·fˆ [d≤i−1]
.
2. With probability 1− r[d≤i] return di. Otherwise, sample a fresh di ← D and go to step 1.
Proposition 4. Ideal p-Tam attack is well defined. Namely, r[d≤i] ∈ [0, 1] for all d≤i ∈ Supp(D)
i.
Proof. Both fˆ [d≤i], fˆ [d≤i−1] are in [−1, 1]. Therefore 0 ≤ 1− fˆ [d≤i] ≤ 2 and 3−p−(1−p) · fˆ [d≤i−1] ≥ 2
which implies 0 ≤ r[d≤i] ≤ 1.
In the following, let Atam be the p-tampering adversary using tampering algorithm Ideal p-Tam.
16
Claim 5. Let Ŝ = (D̂1, . . . , D̂n) be the joint distribution after Atam attack is performed on S ≡ D
n using
ideal p-Tam tampering algorithm. For every prefix d≤i ∈ Supp(D)
i we have,
Pr[D̂i = di | d≤i−1]
Pr[D = di]
=
2− p · (1− fˆ [d≤i])
2− p · (1− fˆ [d≤i−1])
.
Proof. During its execution, ideal p-Tam keeps sampling examples and rejecting them until a sample is
accepted. For ℓ ∈ N we define Rℓ to be the event that is true if the ℓ’th sample in the tampering algorithm is
14As mentioned before, we describe our attacks using range [−1,+1], and then we will do the conversion back to [0, 1].
15Note that here di is the ‘original’ untampered value for block i, while d1, . . . , di−1 might be the result of tampering.
16Therefore, AD , inductively runs p-Tam over the current sequence with probability p. See Definition 5.
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rejected, conditioned on reaching the ℓth sample. We have,
Pr[Rℓ] =
∑
di
Pr[D = di] ·
(
1− fˆ [d≤i]
3− p− (1− p) · fˆ [d≤i−1]
)
=
∑
di
Pr[D = di] · (1− fˆ [d≤i])
3− p− (1− p) · fˆ [d≤i−1]
=
1− fˆ [d≤i−1]
3− p− (1− p) · fˆ [d≤i−1]
.
Let c[d≤i−1] =
1−fˆ [d≤i−1]
3−p−(1−p)·fˆ [d≤i−1]
. Then we have,
Pr[D̂i = di | d≤i−1]
Pr[D = di]
= 1− p+ p ·
 ∞∑
j=0
(1− r[d≤i]) ·
j∏
ℓ=1
Pr[Rℓ]

= 1− p+ p ·
 ∞∑
j=0
(1− r[d≤i]) · c[d≤i−1]
j

= 1− p+ p ·
(
1− r[d≤i]
1− c[d≤i−1]
)
=
2− p+ p · fˆ [d≤i]
2− p+ p · fˆ [d≤i−1]
.
The next corollary follows from Claim 5 and induction. (Recall that µ = fˆ [∅] = fˆ [d≤0] = E[f(S)].)
Corollary 6. By applying the attack Atam based on the ideal p-Tam tampering algorithm, the distribution
after the attack would be as follows,
Pr[Ŝ = z] =
2− p+ p · f(z)
2− p+ p · µ
· Pr[S = z].
Corollary 7. The p-tampering attack Atam (based on the ideal p-Tam tampering algorithm) biases f(·) by
p·ν
2−p+p·µ where µ = E[f(S)], ν = Var[f(S)].
Proof. It holds that E[f(Ŝ)] is equal to∑
z∈Supp(D)n
Pr[Ŝ = z] · f(z) =
∑
z∈Supp(D)n
2− p+ p · f(z)
2− p+ p · µ
· Pr[S = z] · f(z)
=
2− p
2− p+ p · µ
·
 ∑
z∈Supp(D)n
Pr[S = z] · f(z)
+ p
2− p+ p · µ
·
 ∑
z∈Supp(D)n
Pr[S = z] · f(z)2

=
(2− p) · µ
2− p+ p · µ
+
p · (ν + µ2)
2− p+ p · µ
= µ+
p · ν
2− p+ p · µ
.
Corollary 8. For any S ≡ Dn and any function f : Supp(Dn) → [0, 1], there is a p-tampering attack that
given oracle access to fˆ(·) and a sampling oracle for D, it biases the expected value of f by p·ν1−p+p·µ where
µ = E[f(S)], ν = Var[f(S)].
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Proof. Consider another function f ′ = 2 · f − 1. The range of f ′ is now [−1,+1] and we have µ′ =
E[f ′(S)] = 2 · µ − 1 and ν ′ = Var[f ′(S)] = 4 · ν. By Corollary 7, the p-tampering attack Atam biases f
′
by p·ν
′
2−p+p·µ′ . Let Ŝ be the tampered distribution after performing Atam on function f
′ and S. We have,
E[f ′(Ŝ)] ≥ µ′ +
p · ν ′
2− p+ p · µ′
.
Therefore we have,
E[f(Ŝ)] =
E[f ′(Ŝ)] + 1
2
≥
µ′ + 1
2
+
p · ν ′
2 · (2− p+ p · µ′)
= µ+
p · ν
1− p+ p · µ
.
3.2.2 New p-Resetting Biasing Attack (Ideal Version)
Construction 10 (Ideal p-Res). Let D be an arbitrary distribution and S ≡ Dn for some n ∈ N . Also
let f : Supp(D)n 7→ [−1,+1] be an arbitrary function.17 For any i ∈ [n], and given a prefix d≤i−1 ∈
Supp(D)i−1, the p-Res tampering algorithm works as follows.
1. Let r[d≤i] =
1−fˆ [d≤i]
2+p·(1+fˆ [d≤i−1])
.
2. With probability 1− r[d≤i] output the given di.
3. Otherwise sample d′i ← D (i.e., ‘reset’ di) and return d
′
i.
Proposition 9. Ideal p-Res algorithm is well defined. Namely, r[d≤i] ∈ [0, 1] for all d≤i ∈ Supp(D)
i.
Proof. We have fˆ [d≤i] ∈ [−1,+1] and fˆ [d≤i−1] ∈ [−1,+1]. Therefore 0 ≤ 1 − fˆ [d≤i] ≤ 2 and 2 + p ·
(1 + fˆ [d≤i−1]) ≥ 2 which implies 0 ≤ r[d≤i] ≤ 1.
In the following let Ares be the p-tampering adversary using ideal p-Res. (See Definition 5.)
Claim 10. Let Ŝ = (D̂1, . . . , D̂n) be the distribution after the attack Ares (using ideal p-Res tampering
algorithm) is performed on S ≡ Dn. For all d≤i ∈ Supp(D)
i it holds that,
Pr[D̂i = di | d≤i−1]
Pr[D = di]
=
2 + p · (1 + fˆ [d≤i])
2 + p · (1 + fˆ [d≤i−1])
.
Proof. We define R1 to be the event that is true if the given sample is rejected. We have,
Pr[R1] =
∑
di
Pr[D = di] ·
(
1− fˆ [d≤i]
2 + p · (1 + fˆ [d≤i−1])
)
=
∑
di
Pr[D = di] · (1− fˆ [d≤i])
2 + p · (1 + fˆ [d≤i−1])
=
1− fˆ [d≤i−1]
2 + p · (1 + fˆ [d≤i−1])
.
17As mentioned before, we describe our attacks using range [−1,+1], and then we will do the conversion back to [0, 1].
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Therefore, we conclude that,
Pr[D̂i = di | d≤i−1]
Pr[D = di]
= 1− p+ p · (1− r[d≤i] + Pr[R1])
= 1− p+ p ·
(
1 +
fˆ [d≤i]− fˆ [d≤i−1]
2 + p · (1 + fˆ [d≤i−1])
)
= 1 + p ·
(
fˆ [d≤i]− fˆ [d≤i−1]
2 + p · (1 + fˆ [d≤i−1])
)
=
2 + p · (1 + fˆ [d≤i])
2 + p · (1 + fˆ [d≤i−1])
.
The next corollary follows from Claim 10 and induction. (Recall that µ = fˆ [∅] = fˆ [d≤0] = E[f(S)].)
Corollary 11. By applying attack Ares (using ideal p-Res), the distribution after the attack is,
Pr[Ŝ = z] =
2 + p+ p · f(z)
2 + p+ p · µ
· Pr[S = z].
Corollary 12. The p-resetting attack Ares (using ideal p-Res) biases the function by
p·ν
2+p+p·µ where µ =
E[f(S)], ν = Var[f(S)].
Proof. It holds that µ̂ = E[f(Ŝ)] is equal to∑
z∈Supp(D)n
Pr[Ŝ = z] · f(z) =
∑
z∈Supp(D)n
2 + p+ p · f(z)
2 + p+ p · µ
· Pr[S = z] · f(z)
=
2 + p
2 + p+ p · µ
·
 ∑
z∈Supp(D)n
Pr[S = z] · f(z)
+ p
2 + p+ p · µ
·
 ∑
z∈Supp(D)n
Pr[S = z] · f(z)2

=
(2 + p) · µ
2 + p+ p · µ
+
p · (ν + µ2)
2 + p+ p · µ
= µ+
p · ν
2 + p+ p · µ
.
Corollary 13. For S ≡ Dn and any f : Supp(S)→ [0, 1] there exist a p-resetting attack that, given oracle
access to fˆ and a sampling oracle for D, it biases f by p·ν1+p·µ where µ = E[f(S)], ν = Var[f(S)].
Proof. Consider another function f ′ = 2 · f − 1. Now, the range of f ′ is [−1,+1], and we have µ′ =
E[f ′(S)] = 2 · µ− 1 and ν ′ = Var[f ′(S)] = 4 · ν. By Corollary 12, the p-resetting attack Ares biases f
′ by
p·ν′
2−p+p·µ′ . Let Ŝ be the tampered distribution after performing Atam on function f
′ and S. We have,
E[f ′(Ŝ)] ≥ µ′ +
p · ν ′
2 + p+ p · µ′
.
Therefore we have,
E[f(Ŝ)] =
E[f ′(Ŝ)] + 1
2
≥
µ′ + 1
2
+
p · ν ′
2 · (2 + p+ p · µ′)
= µ+
p · ν
1 + p · µ
.
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3.3 Approximating the Ideal Attacks in Polynomial Time
In this subsection, we describe the efficient version of the attacks of Theorem 1 and prove their properties.
We first describe the efficient version of our p-resetting attack, where achieving efficiency is indeed simpler.
We then go over the efficient variant of our p-tampering attack. In both cases, we describe the modifications
needed for the tampering algorithms and it is assumed that such tampering algorithms are used by the main
efficient attackers (see Definition 5).
We start by approximating in polynomial time our Ideal p-resetting attack, as it is simpler to argue about
the polynomial-time version of this attack. We will then use lemmas and ideas that we develop along the
way to also make our 1st Ideal p-tampering attacker also polynomial time.
3.3.1 Polynomial-time Variant of the Ideal p-Resetting Biasing Attack
The p-resetting attack of Construction 10 is not polynomial-time since it needs oracle access to the idealized
oracle providing partial averages. In general, we can not compute such averages exactly in polynomial time,
however in order to make those attacks polynomial-time, we can rely on approximating the partial averages
and consequently the corresponding rejection probabilities. To get the polynomial-time version of the attack
of Construction 10 we can pursue the following idea. For every prefix d≤i, the polynomial-time attacker
first approximates the partial average fˆ [d≤i] by sampling a sufficiently large polynomial number of random
continuations d
(1)
≤n−i, . . . d
(ℓ)
≤n−i and getting the average Ej∈[ℓ][f(d≤i, d
(j)
≤n−i] as an approximation for the
partial average. By Hoeffding inequality, this average is a good approximation of fˆ [d≤i] with exponentially
high probability. Consequently, the rejection probabilities can be approximated well making the final distri-
butions statistically close to the distribution of the ideal attack, meaning that the amount of bias is close to
the ideal bias as well.
Now we formalize the ideas above.
Definition 11 (Semi-ideal oracle f˜ [·]). For distribution D, if for all d≤i ∈ Supp(D)
i we have f˜ξ[d≤i] ∈
fˆ [d≤i] ± ξ, then, we call f˜ξ[·] an ξ-approximation of fˆ [·]. For simplicity, and when it is clear from the
context, we simply write f˜ [·] and call it a semi-ideal oracle.
The following lemma immediately follows from the Hoeffding inequality.
Lemma 14 (Approximating fˆ [·] in polynomial-time). Consider an algorithm that on inputs d≤i and ξ per-
forms as follows where ℓ = −10 ln(ξ/2)/ξ2.
1. Sample (d1≤n−i, . . . , d
ℓ
≤n−i)← (D
n−i+1)ℓ.
2. Output f˜ξ[d≤i] = Ej∈[ℓ] f(d≤i, d
j
≤n−i).
Then it holds that Pr[|f˜ξ[d≤i]− fˆ [d≤i]| ≥ ξ] ≤ ξ.
The above lemma implies that if f is polynomial-time computable andD is polynomial-time samplable,
any q-query algorithm can approximate the semi-ideal oracle f˜ [·] in time poly(q · n/ξ) and total error (of
failing in one of the queries) by at most ξ. Based on this approximation of f˜ [·], we now describe our
polynomial-time version of the Ideal p-Res attack in the semi-ideal oracle model of f˜ [·], by essentially using
the semi-ideal oracle f˜ [·] instead of the ideal oracle fˆ [·].
Construction 12 (Polynomial-time p-Res). Polynomial-time p-Res is the same as ideal p-Res of Construc-
tion 10 but it calls the semi-ideal oracle f˜ξ[·] instead of the ideal oracle fˆ [·].
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In the following we analyze the bias achieved by the the polynomial-time variant of the p-Res algorithm.
We simply pretend that all the queries to the semi-ideal oracle are within ±ξ approximation of the ideal
oracle, knowing that the error of ξ-approximating all of the queries is itself at most ξ and can affect the
average also by at most O(ξ). First we show that the rejection probabilities are approximated well.
Lemma 15. Let 0 < p < 1, 0 < ξ < 1, α, β ∈ [−ξ, ξ], and fˆ [d≤i−1], fˆ [d≤i], f˜ξ[d≤i−1], f˜ξ[d≤i] ∈ [0, 1]
such that f˜ξ[d≤i−1] = fˆ [d≤i−1] +α and f˜ξ[d≤i] = fˆ [d≤i] +β. Let r[.] and r˜[.] respectively be the rejection
probabilities of the Ideal and Polynomial-time p-Res. Then, for every d≤i ∈ Supp(D)
i, |r[d≤i]− r˜[d≤i]| ≤
O(ξ).
Proof. We have,
|r[d≤i]− r˜[d≤i]| =
∣∣∣∣∣ 1− fˆ [d≤i])2 + p · (1 + fˆ [d≤i−1]) − 1− f˜ξ[d≤i]2 + p · (1 + f˜ξ[d≤i−1])
∣∣∣∣∣ ,
where we can compute the following for the right hand side,
=
∣∣∣∣∣(2 + p)(f˜ξ[d≤i]− fˆ [d≤i]) + p · (f˜ξ[d≤i−1]− fˆ [d≤i−1]) + p · (fˆ [d≤i−1]f˜ξ[d≤i]− f˜ξ[d≤i−1]fˆ [d≤i])(2 + p · (1 + fˆ [d≤i−1])) · (2 + p · (1 + f˜ξ[d≤i−1]))
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣(2 + p)(f˜ξ[d≤i]− fˆ [d≤i])∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣p · (f˜ξ[d≤i−1]− fˆ [d≤i−1])∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣p · (fˆ [d≤i−1]f˜ξ[d≤i]− f˜ξ[d≤i−1]fˆ [d≤i])∣∣∣
2 · 2
≤
(2 + p)ξ + pξ + p
∣∣∣fˆ [d≤i−1](fˆ [d≤i] + β)− (fˆ [d≤i−1] + α)fˆ [d≤i]∣∣∣
4
=
2ξ + 2pξ + p
∣∣∣βfˆ [d≤i−1]− αfˆ [d≤i]∣∣∣
4
≤
2ξ + 2pξ + p · (|β|+ | − α|)
4
≤ 3ξ/2 .
Now we want to argue that when we approximate the p-resetting tampering algorithm’s rejection prob-
abilities as proved in Lemma 15, it leads to ‘close probabilities’ of sampling final outputs. We prove the
following general lemma that will be also useful for the case of Polynomial-time p-Tam attack. For the case
of p-resetting, we only need the special case of k = 1.
Notation. For p ∈ [0, 1] and distributions X,Y , by Z ≡ (1 − p)X + pY we denote the distribution Z in
which we sample fromX with probability 1− p, and otherwise (i.e., with probability p) we sample from Y .
Definition 13 ((p, k, ρ)-variations). For any distribution D, function ρ : Supp(D)→ [0, 1], and k ∈ N, the
(p, k, ρ)-variation of D is Dp,k,ρ ≡ (1− p)D + pZ , where Z is defined as follows.
1. Sample (d1, . . . , dk)← D
k.
2. For i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, go sequentially over d1, . . . , dk, and with probability ρ[di] return di and exit.
3. If nothing was returned after reading all the k samples, return a fresh sample dk+1 ← D.
Lemma 16 (Implication of approximating rejection probabilities). LetD be a distribution and ρ : Supp(D)→
[0, 1] and ρ′ : Supp(D) → [0, 1] be two functions such that ∀d ∈ Supp(D), |ρ(d) − ρ′(d)| ≤ ξ. Then, for
every k ∈ N and every d ∈ Supp(D), it holds that,∣∣∣∣ln( Pr[Dp,k,ρ = d]Pr[Dp,k,ρ′ = d]
)∣∣∣∣ ≤ p1− p · (k2 + k) · ξ.
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Before proving the lemma above, we note that it indeed implies that the max divergence [DRV10] of
Dp,k,ρ and Dp,k,ρ′ is at most O(k
2 · ξ).
Proof. Let a = Ed←D[ρ(d)] and a
′ = Ed←D[ρ
′(d)]. We have,
Pr[Dp,k,ρ = d]
Pr[D = d]
= (1− p) + p · ((1 − a)k +
∑
i∈[k−1]
ρ(d) · (1− a)i).
With a similar calculation for Pr[Dp,k,ρ′ = d] we get,
Pr[Dp,k,ρ = d]
Pr[Dp,k,ρ′ = d]
=
(1− p) + p · ((1− a)k +
∑
i∈[k−1] ρ(d) · (1− a)
i)
(1− p) + p · ((1− a′)k +
∑
i∈[k−1] ρ(d) · (1− a
′)i)
= 1 +
p · ((1 − a)k − (1− a′)k +
∑
i∈[k−1] ρ(d) · (1− a)
i − ρ′(d) · (1− a′)i)
(1− p) + p · ((1− a′)k +
∑
i∈[k−1] ρ(d) · (1− a
′)i)
≤ 1 +
p · (k · ξ +
∑
i∈[k−1](2i + 1) · ξ)
1− p
= 1 +
p
1− p
(k2 + k) · ξ
≤ e
p
1−p
(k2+k)·ξ.
Similarly, we have
Pr[Dp,k,ρ′=d]
Pr[Dp,k,ρ=d]
≤ e
p
1−p
(k2+k)ξ
which implies that,∣∣∣∣ln( Pr[Dp,k,ρ = d]Pr[Dp,k,ρ′ = d]
)∣∣∣∣ ≤ p1− p · (k2 + k) · ξ.
The following lemma states that the expected values of a function over two distributions that are ‘close’
(under max divergence) are indeed close real numbers.
Lemma 17. LetX = (X1, . . . ,Xn) and Y = (Y1, . . . , Yn) be two joint distributions such that Supp(X) =
Supp(Y ) and for every prefix x≤i such that Pr[Xi = xi | x≤i−1] > 0, we have,∣∣∣∣ln(Pr[Xi = xi | x≤i−1]Pr[Yi = xi | x≤i−1]
)∣∣∣∣ ≤ ξ.
Then, for any function f : Supp(X)→ [−1,+1] we have,
E[f(X)] ≥ E[f(Y )]− eξ·n + 1.
Proof. First, we note that for every x ∈ Supp(X) it holds that,
∣∣∣∣ln(Pr[X = x]Pr[Y = x]
)∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i∈[n]
ln
(
Pr[Xi = xi | x≤i−1]
Pr[Yi = xi | x≤i−1]
)∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ n · ξ.
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Now for the difference E[f(Y )]−E[f(X)] we have,∑
x∈Supp(X)
(Pr[Y = x]− Pr[X = x]) · f(x)
≤
∑
x∈Supp(X)
|(Pr[Y = x]− Pr[X = x]) · f(x)|
≤
∑
x∈Supp(X)
∣∣∣∣min(Pr[X = x],Pr[Y = x]) · (max(Pr[X = x],Pr[Y = x])min(Pr[X = x],Pr[Y = x]) − 1
)
· f(x)
∣∣∣∣
≤ (en·ξ − 1) ·
∑
x∈Supp(X)
|min(Pr[X = x],Pr[Y = x]) · f(x)|
≤ en·ξ − 1.
Putting things together. Now we show how to choose the parameters of the Polynomial-time p-Res.
Suppose ξ′ is the parameter of Theorem 1. If we choose ξ as the parameter of our attack we can bound the
final bias as follows. Firstly, if the approximation algorithm of Lemma 14 gives us a semi-ideal oracle f˜ξ[.],
then based on Lemma 15 we can approximate the rejection probabilities with error at mostO(ξ). Then based
on Lemma 16 the attack Ares that uses efficient p-Res generates a distribution that is O(
p
1−p · ξ)-close
18 to
the distribution of the attack Ares that uses ideal p-Res.
Now we can use Lemma 17 (for k = 1) to argue that the bias achieved by the efficient adversary is
(eO(n·ξ·
p
1−p
) − 1)-close to the bias achieved by the ideal adversary. Also note that, if the approximation
algorithm fails to provide a semi-ideal oracle for all queries, then the bias of the efficient attack is at least
−2 because the function range is [−1,+1]. However, the probability of this event is bounded by O(n · ξ)
because adversary needs at most 2n number of queries to f˜ . Therefore, the difference of bias of the efficient
and the ideal adversary is at mostO(n·ξ)+eO(n·ξ·
p
1−p
)−1which is at mostO(n·ξ+n·ξ· p1−p) if the exponent
in e
O(n·ξ· p
1−p
)
is at most 1. As a result, if we choose ξ = o
(
ξ′/(n · p1−p)
)
= o (ξ′ · (1− p)/(n · p)), we can
indeed guarantee that the bias of the efficient adversary is ξ′-close to bias of ideal adversary.
3.3.2 Polynomial-time Variant of our p-Tampering Biasing Attack
Building upon the ideas developed above to make our Ideal p-Res tampering algorithm polynomial time, here
we focus on our Ideal p-Tam attack. We start by describing a variant of the original attack of Construction 9
where we cut the rejection sampling procedure after k iterations.
Construction 14 (Ideal k-cut p-Tam). Ideal k-cut p-Tam is the same as ideal p-Tam of Construction 9 but
it is forced to stop and return a fresh sample if the first k samples were rejected.
Now we show that the new modified attack of Construction 14 will lead to a close distribution compared
to the original attack of Construction 9.
Lemma 18. Let Ŝ = (D̂1, . . . , D̂n) be the joint distribution after Atam attack is performed on S ≡ D
n
using ideal p-Tam tampering algorithm. Also, let Ŝ′ = (D̂′1, . . . , D̂
′
n) be the joint distribution after Atam
18Since we are assuming p < 1 is constant O( p
1−p
· ξ) simply means O(ξ).
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attack is performed on S using Ideal k-cut p-Tam tampering algorithm. For every prefix d≤i ∈ Supp(D)
i,∣∣∣∣∣ln
(
Pr[D̂i = di | d≤i−1]
Pr[D̂′i = di|d≤i−1]
)∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ p(1− p)2 · (2− p)k−1 .
Proof. Let r[d≤i] =
1−fˆ [d≤i]
3−p−(1−p)·fˆ [d≤i−1]
and c[d≤i−1] =
1−fˆ [d≤i−1]
3−p−(1−p)·fˆ [d≤i−1]
as it was defined in proof of
Claim 5. We have,
Pr[D̂′i = di | d≤i−1]
Pr[D = di]
= (1− p) + p ·
(c[d≤i−1])k + ∑
j∈[k−1]
(1− r[d≤i]) · (1− c[d≤i)]
j)

= (1− p) + p ·
(
(c[d≤i−1])
k +
(1− r[d≤i]) · (1− c[d≤i−1]
k)
1− c[d≤i−1]
)
.
Also, in the proof of Claim 5 we showed that,
Pr[D̂i = di | d≤i−1]
Pr[D = di]
= 1− p+ p ·
(
1− r[d≤i]
1− c[d≤i−1]
)
.
Therefore, we conclude that,
Pr[D̂′i = di | d≤i−1]
Pr[D̂i = di | d≤i−1]
=
(1− p) + p ·
(
(c[d≤i−1])
k +
(1−r[d≤i])·(1−c[d≤i−1]
k)
1−c[d≤i−1]
)
1− p+ p ·
(
1−r[d≤i]
1−c[d≤i−1]
)
= 1 +
p ·
(
(r[d≤i]−c[d≤i−1])·c[d≤i−1]
k
1−c[d≤i−1]
)
1− p+ p ·
(
1−r[d≤i]
1−c[d≤i−1]
) .
We also know that c[d≤i−1] ≤
1
2−p because fˆ [d≤i−1] ∈ [−1,+1]. So we have,
Pr[D̂′i = di | d≤i−1]
Pr[D̂i = di | d≤i−1]
= 1 +
p ·
(
(r[d≤i]−c[d≤i−1])·c[d≤i−1]
k
1−c[d≤i−1]
)
1− p+ p ·
(
1−r[d≤i]
1−c[d≤i−1]
)
≤ 1 +
p · c[d≤i−1]
k
(1− p) · (1− c[d≤i−1])
≤ 1 +
p
(1− p)2 · (2− p)k−1
≤ e
p
(1−p)2(2−p)k−1 .
Also for the inverse ratio, we have,
Pr[D̂i = di | d≤i−1]
Pr[D̂′i = di | d≤i−1]
= 1 +
p ·
(
(c[d≤i−1]−r[d≤i])·c[d≤i−1]
k
1−c[d≤i−1]
)
(1− p) + p ·
(
(c[d≤i−1])k +
(1−r[d≤i])·(1−c[d≤i−1]k)
1−c[d≤i−1]
)
≤ 1 +
p · c[d≤i−1]
k
(1− p) · (1− c[d≤i−1])
≤ 1 +
p
(1− p)2 · (2− p)k−1
≤ e
p
(1−p)2·(2−p)k−1 .
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Therefore, we can finally conclude that,∣∣∣∣∣ln
(
Pr[D̂i = di | d≤i−1]
Pr[D̂′i = di|d≤i−1]
)∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ p(1− p)2 · (2− p)k−1 .
Lemma 19. Let Ŝ = (D̂1, . . . , D̂n) be the joint distribution after Atam attack is performed on S ≡ D
n
using ideal p-Tam tampering algorithm. Also, let Ŝ′ = (D̂′1, . . . , D̂
′
n) be the joint distribution after Atam
attack is performed on S using Ideal k-cut p-Tam tampering algorithm where k = ln(2−p)−2 ln((1−p)·ξ)ln(2−p) .
Then, it holds that,
E[f(Ŝ′)] ≥ E[f(Ŝ)]− en·ξ + 1.
Proof. Using Lemma 18, for every prefix d≤i ∈ Supp(D)
i we have,∣∣∣∣∣ln
(
Pr[D̂i = di | d≤i−1]
Pr[D̂′i = di|d≤i−1]
)∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ p(1− p)2 · (2− p)k−1 ≤ ξ.
Now, using Lemma 17 we get E[f(Ŝ′)] ≥ E[f(Ŝ)]− en·ξ + 1.
We can now describe the actual efficient variant of our Ideal p-Tam attack.
Construction 15 (Polynomial-time k-cut p-Tam). Efficient k-cut p-Tam is the same as Ideal k-cut p-Tam
of Construction 14 but it it calls the semi-ideal oracle f˜ξ[·] instead of the ideal oracle fˆ [·].
Lemma 20. Let 0 < p < 1. Let 0 < ξ < 1. Let α, β ∈ [−ξ, ξ]. Let fˆ [d≤i−1], fˆ [d≤i], f˜ξ[d≤i−1], f˜ξ[d≤i] ∈
[0, 1] such that f˜ξ[d≤i−1] = fˆ [d≤i−1] + α and f˜ξ[d≤i] = fˆ [d≤i] + β. Let r[.] and r˜[.] respectively be the
rejection probabilities of the Ideal and Efficient k-cut p-Tam. Then, for every d≤i ∈ Supp(D)
i we have
|r[d≤i]− r˜[d≤i]| ≤ O(ξ).
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 15. We have,
|r[d≤i]− r˜[d≤i]| =
∣∣∣∣∣ 1− fˆ [d≤i])3− p− (1− p)fˆ [d≤i−1] − 1− f˜ξ[d≤i]3− p− (1− p)f˜ξ[d≤i−1]
∣∣∣∣∣ ,
where we can compute the following for the right hand side,
=
∣∣∣∣∣(1− fˆ [d≤i])(3 − p− (1− p)f˜ξ[d≤i−1])− (1− f˜ξ[d≤i])(3 − p− (1− p)fˆ [d≤i−1])(3− p− (1− p)fˆ [d≤i−1])(3 − p− (1− p)f˜ξ[d≤i−1])
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣∣(1− p)(fˆ [d≤i−1]− f˜ξ[d≤i−1]) + (3− p)(f˜ξ[d≤i]− fˆ [d≤i]) + (1− p)(f˜ξ[d≤i−1]fˆ [d≤i]− fˆ [d≤i−1]f˜ξ[d≤i])(3− p− (1− p))(3 − p− (1− p))
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
(1− p)ξ + (3− p)ξ + (1− p)
∣∣∣(fˆ [d≤i−1] + α) fˆ [d≤i]− fˆ [d≤i−1](fˆ [d≤i] + β)∣∣∣
4
≤
4ξ + |α|+ |β|
4
≤ 3ξ/2 .
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Putting things together. Now we show how to choose the parameters of the Efficient k-cut p-Tam. Sup-
pose ξ′ is the parameter of Theorem 1. If we choose ξ as the parameter of our attack we can bound the
final bias as follows. Firstly, if the approximation algorithm of Lemma 14 gives us a semi-ideal oracle f˜ξ[.],
then based on Lemma 20 we can approximate the rejection probabilities with error at most O(ξ). Then
based on Lemma 16 the attack Atam that uses the efficient k-cut p-Tam generates a distribution that is
O( p1−p · k
2 · ξ)-close to the distribution of the attack Atam that uses ideal k-cut p-Tam.
We use Lemma 17 to argue that the bias of an efficient adversary is
(
eO(n·ξ·k
2· p
1−p
)−1
)
-close to the bias
of the ideal adversary. Also note that, if the approximation algorithm fails to provide a semi-ideal oracle
for all queries, then bias of efficient attack is at least −2 because the function range is [−1,+1]. However,
the probability of this event is bounded by O(k · n · ξ) because the adversary needs at most (k + 1) · n
number of queries to f˜ . Therefore, the difference of bias of the efficient and the ideal adversary is at most
O(k · n · ξ) + eO(k
2·n·ξ· p
1−p
) − 1 which is at most O(n · ξ + k2 · n · ξ · p1−p) if the exponent in e
O(k2·n·ξ· p
1−p
)
is at most 1. As a result, if we choose ξ = o(ξ′/(k2 · n · p1−p)) = o(ξ
′ · (1− p)/(k2 · n · p)), we can indeed
guarantee that the bias of the efficient adversary (that uses efficient k-cut p-Tam tampering algorithm) is
ξ′-close to the bias of the ideal adversary (that uses ideal k-cut p-Tam).
Now we want to select our other parameter k. Based on Lemma 19, if we choose k = ω
(
ln((1−p)ξ′)
ln(2−p)
)
the bias of the attack Atam that uses the ideal k-cut p-Tam would be ξ
′-close to the bias of the attack Atam
that uses the ideal p-Tam. Therefore, the bias of the Atam that uses efficient k-cut attack is 2 · ξ
′-close to the
bias of Atam that uses ideal p-Tam.
4 Feasibility of PAC Learning under p-Tampering and p-Budget Attacks
In this section, we study the non-targeted case where PAC learning could be defined. We show that realiz-
able problems that are PAC learnable (without attacks), are usually PAC learnable under p-tampering attacks
as well. Essentially we bound the probability of some bad event happening (see Definition 17) in a manner
similar to Occam algorithms [BEHW87] by relying on the realizability assumption and relying on the spe-
cific property of the p-tampering attacks. In particular, we crucially rely on the fact that any p-tampering
distribution D̂ of a distribution D contains a (1−p) ·D measure in itself. In fact, we show (see Theorem 23)
that in a close scenario to p-tampering in which the adversary can choose the (≤ p fraction of the) tampering
locations, PAC learning might suddenly become impossible. This shows that the ‘mistake-free’ nature of
p-tampering is indeed not enough for PAC learnability.19
4.1 Definitions
Definition 16. For problem P = (X ,Y,D,H,Loss), distribution D ∈ D, and training sequence S =
((x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn)) ← D
n, we say that the event Badε(D,S) holds, if there exists an h ∈ H such that
h(xi) = yi for every i ∈ [n] and RiskD(h) > ε.
Definition 17 (Special PAC Learnability). A realizable problem P = (X ,Y,D,H,Loss) is called special
(ε(n), δ(n))-PAC learnable if for all D ∈ D, n ∈ N, PrS←Dn [Badε(D,S)] ≤ δ(n). Special (ε(n), δ(n))-
PAC learnability under poisoning attacks is defined similarly, where we demand the inequality to hold for
every A ∈ AD tampering with the training set Ŝ ← A(S).
19We note that bounded-budget noise and in fact malicious has also been discussed outside of PAC learning; e.g., [AKST97] in
the membership query model of Angluin [Ang87].
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It is easy to see that if P is special (ε(n), δ(n))-PAC learnable, then it is (ε(n), δ(n))-PAC learnable
through a ‘canonical’ learner L who simply finds and outputs a hypothesis h consistent with the training
sample set S . Such an h always exists due to the realizability assumption. In fact, many efficient PAC
learning results follow this very recipe.20 That motivates our next definition.
Definition 18 (Efficient Realizability). We say that the problem P = (X ,Y,D,H,Loss) is efficiently real-
izable, if there is a polynomial-time algorithm M , such that for all D ∈ D, and all S ← Dn,M(S) outputs
some h ∈ H such that RiskD(h) = 0.
Here we define two types of tampering attackers who do have control over which examples they tamper
with, yet with a ‘bounded budget’ limiting the number of such instances. Our definitions are inspired by
the notions of adaptive corruption [CFGN96] and strong adaptive corruption defined by Goldwasser, Kalai,
and Park [GKP15b] in the secure multi-party (coin-flipping) protocols.
Definition 19 (p-budget attacks). The class of strong p-budget (tampering) attacks Apbud = ∪D∈DAD is
defined as follows. For D ∈ D, any A ∈ AD has a (randomized) tampering algorithm Tam such that:
1. Given access to a sampling oracle for distributionD, TamD(·) always outputs something in Supp(D).
2. Given any training sequence S = (d1, . . . , dn), the tampered output Ŝ = (d̂1, . . . , d̂n) is generated
by A inductively (over i ∈ [n]) as d̂i ← Tam
D(1n, d̂1, . . . , d̂i−1, di).
3. The number of locations that Tam actually changes di is bounded as |{i | di 6= d̂i}| ≤ p · n.
Weak p-budget tampering attacks are defined similarly, with the following difference. The tampering algo-
rithm’s execution TamD(1n, d̂1, . . . , d̂i−1) is not given di, but instead it could either output oi ∈ Supp(D),
in which case we let d̂i = oi, or it outputs a special symbol ⊥, in which case we will have d̂i = di. Finally,
since the weak p-budget attacker should make its decisions without the knowledge of di, we shall have
|{i | ⊥ 6= oi}| ≤ p · n.
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4.2 Our Results
We first prove that PAC learning is possible under weak p-budget (poisoning) attacks. We then show that
this implies a similar possibility result under p-tampering attacks. We then prove that a similar result does
not hold for strong p-budget attacks in general. Our positive result (Theorem 21) holds even if the tam-
pering algorithm is given all the history of tampered and untampered blocks (i.e., it is given given input
(1n, d̂1, . . . , d̂i−1, d1, . . . , di)), and our impossibility result (Theorem 23) holds even if the tampering algo-
rithm is given only di.
Theorem 21 (PAC learning under weak p-budget attacks). For any p ∈ (0, 1), if a realizable problem P =
(X ,Y,D,H,Loss) is (ε(n), δ(n))-special PAC learnable, then, P is also (ε (n · (1− p)) , δ (n · (1− p)))-
special PAC learnable under weak p-budget (poisoning) attacks.
20For example, properly learning monomials [Val84], or using 3-CNF formulae to learn 3-term DNF formulae [PV88]; the latter
is an example of realizable but not proper learning. As an example where the realizability assumption does not necessarily hold,
see e.g., [Dio16], for learning monotone monomials under a class of distributions - including uniform.
21The reason that we did not use the condition |{i | di 6= d̂i}| ≤ p · n is the weak p-budget case is that, if the attacker chooses
to tamper with the i’th location and simply happens to pick the same oi = di, it should still count against its total budget.
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Proof. Without loss of generality, we can assume that the tampering algorithm of the adversary is determin-
istic (otherwise, we can fix the randomness to what is the best for the adversary, and we get a deterministic
one again.) For i ∈ [n] letDi be the random variable corresponding to the ith example before performing the
tampering algorithm and let (Dˆ1, . . . , Dˆn) be the joint distribution of the training sequence after performing
the tampering algorithm. Also let Ti be a boolean random variable which is equal to 1 if the adversary picks
to choose the i’th example and Ti = 0 otherwise. Using the notation of Definition 19, Ti = 0 if oi = ⊥, and
Ti = 1 otherwise. For i ∈ [(1 − p) · n] let Ui be the random variable corresponding to the index of the i’th
zero in the sequence T1, . . . , Tn, and letWi ≡ DˆUi . We prove that the joint distribution (W1, . . . ,W(1−p)·n)
is distributed identically toD(1−p)·n. For every i ∈ [(1− p) · n] and d≤i ∈ Supp(D
i) we have,
Pr[Wi = di | W≤i−1 = d≤i−1] =
n∑
j=1
Pr[Dˆj = di | W≤i−1 = d≤i−1 ∧ Ui = j] · Pr[Ui = j]
Based on the assumption that the tampering algorithm of the adversary is deterministic, we know that Ti
is a function of D≤i−1. On the other hand, Di is independent of D≤i−1, so Di and Ti are independent.
Therefore, for all predicates R : Supp(D≤i−1) → [0, 1] such that R(D≤i−1) = 1 implies Ti = 0 (i.e.,
Pr[Ti = 0 | R(D≤i−1) = 1] = 1) we have,
Pr[Dˆi = d | R(D≤i−1) = 1] = Pr[Di = d | R(D≤i−1) = 1] = Pr[Di = d].
It is clear thatW≤i−1 = d≤i−1∧Ui = j is a predicate ofD≤j−1 as it is a predicate of Dˆ≤j−1 and T≤j . Also
this predicate implies Tj = 0, therefore we have,
Pr[Wi = di | W≤i−1 = d≤i−1] =
n∑
j=1
Pr[Dˆj = di | W≤i−1 = d≤i−1 ∧ Ui = j] · Pr[Ui = j]
=
n∑
j=1
Pr[Dj = di] · Pr[Ui = j] = Pr[D = di]
which implies (W1, . . . ,W(1−p)·n) ≡ D
(1−p)·n.
Now let εˆ(n) = ε ((1− p) · n) and δˆ(n) = δ ((1− p) · n). Consider two sets,
Good1 = {S ∈ Supp(D
n) : Badεˆ(n)(D,S)} and Good2 = {S ∈ Supp(D
(1−p)·n) : Badεˆ(n)(D,S)}.
Based on the definition of the event Bad (Definition 16) we know that,
Pr
[
(Dˆ1, . . . , Dˆn) ∈ Good1 | (W1, . . . ,W(1−p)·n) ∈ Good2
]
= 1.
Therefore we have,
Pr
[
(Dˆ1, . . . , Dˆn) ∈ Good1
]
≥ Pr
[
(W1, . . . ,W(1−p)·n) ∈ Good2
]
= Pr[D(1−p)·n ∈ Good2] ≥ 1− δˆ(n).
We now derive the following theorem about p-tampering attacks from Theorem 21.
26
Theorem 22 (PAC learning under weak p-tampering attacks). For any p ∈ (0, 1), if a realizable problem
P = (X ,Y,D,H,Loss) is (ε(n), δ(n))-special PAC learnable, then for any q ∈ (0, 1 − p), P is also
(ε′(m), δ′(m))-special PAC learnable under p-tampering poisoning attacks for ε′(m) = ε(m · (1 − p −
q)), δ′(m) = e−2m·q
2
+ δ(m · (1 − p − q)). Thus, if P is efficiently realizable and special PAC learnable,
then P is also efficiently PAC learnable under p-tampering.
Proof. Consider a p tampering attacker. By Hoeffding inequality of Lemma 6, the probability that this
attacker tampers with more than (p + q) ·m input instances is at most e−2m·q
2
. Therefore, with probability
1 − e−2m·q
2
, this attacker is a special case of a weak (p + q)-budget attacker, as it does not choose the
locations of the attack, and thus cannot choose the tampering locations based on the content of the training
examples. Therefore, we can obtain the same bounds of Theorem 21, but we shall use p + q as the budget
(fraction) and also add e−2m·q
2
to the confidence error.
Theorem 23 (Impossibility of PAC learning under strong p-budget attacks). For any constant p ∈ (0, 1),
there is a problem P = (X ,Y,D,H,Loss) that is PAC learnable (under no attack), but it is not PAC learnable
under strong p-budget (poisoning) attacks.
Proof. Suppose X = [k] where k = ⌈2p⌉. Let Y = {0, 1}, and suppose D consists of all (x, c(x))x←X
where x ← X is an example drawn from X uniformly at random and c is an arbitrary function (concept)
in YX . Let the hypothesis class H contain all of YX , and Loss(b0, b1) = |b0 − b1| is the natural loss for
classifiers.
PAC learnability of P trivially follows from the fact that |X | = k is finite. Therefore, enough samples
will reveal the concept function c (defined through D) completely with overwhelming probability for large
enough samples n. Consider a concept class which consists of only two functions c0 and c1 such that,
c0(i) = 0,∀i ∈ [k], and
c1(i) =
{
0 i ∈ [k − 1]
1 i = k.
Now we propose a strong p-budget adversary Asb (sb stands for (strong budgeted)) that replaces every pair
(k, ∗) it sees with (k−1, 0) until it runs out of its budget which is p ·n examples. We denote the distribution
of examples after the attack is performed by Asb(D
n). Let us define an event E which is 0 if the adversary
runs out of budget at some point and is 1 if she does not run out of budget. Note that if c0 is being used
then the adversary will not do any thing at all and cannot run out of budget. If c1 is used we can bound the
probability of adversary running out of its budget using Chernoff bound as follows,
Pr[E] ≥ 1− e
−n
3k .
Let L be a learning algorithm that is going to learn a concept c sampled uniformly from {c0, c1} by looking
at n labeled examples sampled from Asb(D
n
c ) where Dc ≡ (d, c(d))d←U[k] . We have,
Pr
c←{c0,c1}
h←L(Asb(D
n
c ))
[h(k) = c(k) | E] ≤
1
2
.
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The reason is that two conditional distributions (Asb(D
n
c0) | E) and (Asb(D
n
c1) | E) are identical, and there
is no way for the learning algorithm to find out which of these distributions are being used. Therefore,
E
c←{c0,c1}
h←L(Asb(D
n
c ))
[RiskDc(h)] ≥
1
k
· Pr
c←{c0,c1}
h←L(Asb(D
n
c ))
[h(k) 6= c(k)]
≥
1
k
· Pr
c←{c0,c1}
h←L(Asb(D
n
c ))
[h(k) 6= c(k) | E] · Pr[E]
≥
1− e
n
3k
2k
.
Now let εc(n) and δc(n) be the error and confidence that L provides when using n examples sampled from
A(Dnc ). We know that,
E
h←L(Asb(Dnc ))
[RiskDc(h)] ≤ εc(n) + δc(n)
which implies,
E
c←{c0,c1}
h←L(Asb(D
n
c ))
[RiskDc(h)] ≤
εc0(n) + δc0(n) + εc1(n) + δc1(n)
2
.
Therefore we have,
εc0(n) + δc0(n) + εc1(n) + δc1(n) ≥
1− e
−n
3k
k
which means for any learning algorithm L, one of these values will remain at least Ω(1/k) = Ω(p) no
matter how many examples the algorithm uses.
5 Open Questions
We conclude with discussing some natural directions for future work that remain open following our work.
Bounds for attacking specific problems and/or specific learners. The bounds of Corollaries 3 and 2
apply to any PAC learning problem P and any learner L for problem P. Therefore, one can possibly get
much stronger bounds for specific learning problems, and even for a fixed learning problem P, one can get
even better bounds if specific learning algorithms are attacked.
Learning under p-tampering without realizability. The result of Theorems 21 and 22 require the real-
izability assumption to hold for the learning problem P. In what settings do these result extend without the
realizability assumption?
Learning under targeted p-tampering. Theorems 21 and 22 both apply to the case of non-targeted poi-
soning attacks, where the adversary does not know the final test example. A natural open question is whether,
at least for specific natural cases, this result extends even to the targeted case, where the adversary’s tamper-
ing strategy could depend on the final test example drawn from the same distribution D as that of training.
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Complementary positive result for Theorem 23. Based on Definition 19, the attacks of [KL93] in the
malicious noise model fall into our category of weak attacks (as they do not need to know the label of the
tampered example) while attacks in the nasty noise model are of strong form. However, both of these works
[KL93, BEK02] are allowed to generate examples with wrong labels. Both of these works [KL93] and
[BEK02] also prove lower bounds and matching upper bounds for the achievable accuracy of learners in
presence of malicious noise and nasty noise respectively. Our Theorem 23 proves a lower bound of ω(p)
on the achievable accuracy or the confidence parameter of learners in presence of ‘strong’ p-budgets attacks
which are limited to use examples with correct labels. Are there any similar matching upper bounds for the
lower bounds of Theorem 23?
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